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A bstract
Security of computer networks normally relies on a 
trusted authority who is responsible for setting up 
the system and distributing cryptographic keys. If 
the trusted authority is compromised due to an at­
tack, then the security of the entire system will be 
compromised. In this paper, we will look into this 
issue in terms of identity-based (or ID-based) cryp­
tography. Since the introduction of identity-based 
(or ID-based) cryptography in 1984 by Shamir, ID- 
based cryptography has attracted many research 
due to its simplicity. However, ID-based cryptogra­
phy suffers from several drawbacks, namely the re­
quirement of having a secure channel during the key 
extraction and a complete trust to be placed on a 
trusted authority (or a so-called Private Key Gener­
ator PKG). In this paper, we overcome these prob­
lems by proposing a new key extraction algorithm 
that does not have these two limitations. We are 
only concentrating on the key extraction problem 
and hence, our schemes are applicable in any other 
ID-based scheme that has similar structure, such as 
Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption scheme, etc. 
Keywords: ID-based cryptography, bilinear pairing, 
key extraction.
1 Introduction
In computer networks, the communications among 
nodes should be protected against various attacks. 
To ensure a sound protection, various crypto­
graphic methods can be deployed and some secure 
cryptographic-key distribution mechanisms should 
be applied. However, such methods and mecha­
nisms usually rely on a trusted network authority 
who may be a certificate authority responsible for 
setting up the system and/or distributing crypto­
graphic keys. The obvious concern is that the en­
tire system could be compromised if the trusted au­
thority is compromised due to an attack from ad­
versaries.
In a traditional certificate based public key cryp­
tography, a key generation procedure invariantly 
contains a function F, where the public key PIC 
is defined in terms of the secret key SIC as VIC =  
F(S1C), where F  is an efficient and one-way func­
tion that maps from the private key space to the 
public key space. Due to the one-wayness of the 
function F, the public key VIC always contains a 
part that looks random. In practice, verification of 
a user’s public key is certified with a certificate is­
sued by a certification authority (CA). Any partic­
ipant who would like to use a public key must first 
verify the correctness of the corresponding certifi­
cate to ensure the validity of the public key. Nev­
ertheless, this issue has lead into a different prob­
lem called trust relationship, when many CAs are 
involved. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is an im­
portant infrastructure that is used to manage the 
trust relationship between entities in a hierarchical 
manner. As a consequence, certificate-based public 
key cryptosystems require a large amount of storage 
and computing time to store and verify certificates.
In [13], Shamir suggested that the public keys 
are chosen from the users’ identities, such as e- 
mail address, IP address, etc. and hence, it is 
named an identity-based public-key cryptography 
(or ID-based cryptography, for short). In an ID- 
based cryptography, the private key is computed 
by a key extraction algorithm, which is defined as 
SIC =  F(master-key, ID). Note that the ID is the 
public key VIC in a traditional public key cryptog­
raphy. The so-called master-key is the long term 
secret key that is owned by the Private Key Gener­
ator (P K G ). Note that since ID is used to replace 
the usual public key, then the authenticity of the 
public key is no longer a problem. However, there 
is a new protocol introduced in this system, called 
the key extraction algorithm, which is a service of­
fered by a trusted P K G  to system wide users. This 
service is essentially an authentication service: the 
resulting private key from this algorithm provides 
the key owner with a credential for his/her ID-based
public key to be recognized and used by other users 
in the system. Essentially, before the secret key for 
an identity is released, the P K G  must conduct a 
thorough check of the identity information of the 
user. This check may include some physical means 
of identification, which is similar to the identifica­
tion check before a CA issues a public key certificate 
to a user in a traditional public key cryptography 
setting.
In the same paper [13], Shamir provided a con­
crete ID-based signature scheme, but he questioned 
the existence of an ID-based encryption (IBE) 
scheme. It was not known whether IBE scheme 
exists, until shown recently by Boneh and Franklin 
that an efficient IBE can be constructed from bilin­
ear pairings on “weak” elliptic curves [2], Interest­
ingly, the key extraction algorithm in [2] is known 
later on as a short signature scheme based on bilin­
ear pairing [3].
Problems with ID-based Cryptography 
Despite of all the nice features that ID-based cryp­
tography can offer, ID-based cryptography suffers 
from several drawbacks.
Firstly, an inherent problem in ID-based cryp­
tography is the key escrow problem. Since all user’s 
private keys are generated by the PK G , they must 
place an absolute trust to the PK G . The trust 
must be absolute, complete and unconditional. Es­
sentially, this means that the PKG can read all the 
private communications or forge all of their signa­
tures. Hence, as noted by Shamir in his seminal pa­
per in [13], ID-based cryptography is suitable in a 
closed environment, for example in an organization 
environment in which the employer has the com­
plete ownership of the information communicated 
to and from the employees, then the employer can 
play the role of PK G .
We note that this is not a new issue. This prob­
lem has been addressed in several work in the lit­
erature by employing multiple authority approach 
[2, 5] or by using some user-chosen secret infor­
mation [1, 14, 7, 10], It was noted in [2] that if 
the master-key is distributed to multiple PKG s  and 
a private key is computed in a threshold manner, 
then the key escrow problem of a single P K G  can 
be prevented. However, in practice, having many 
PKGs  who will generate a secret key to a user is 
quite a burden. A different approach by generating 
a new private key by adding multiple private keys 
was proposed in [5], Nevertheless, in this scheme, 
PKG s  have no countermeasure against user’s ille­
gal usage. A certificate-based encryption (and later, 
signature scheme) was proposed by Gentry in [7], 
In this scheme, the user’s secret key is computed 
by adding some user-chosen secret information, but 
in fact, it becomes a certificate-based scheme losing 
the advantage of ID-based cryptography. Similar,
but different, approach was taken by Al-Riyami and 
Paterson in [1] by proposing a certificateless cryp­
tography. In certificateless cryptography, the need 
of certificate has been completely removed. After 
the key extraction algorithm is invoked (by an in­
teractive protocol between the P K G  and the user), 
the user needs to add his user-chosen secret infor­
mation and later on, publish his public key. Again, 
in this scheme, the advantage of ID-based cryptog­
raphy has been removed since the public key is re­
quired to be published by the user. In a more re­
cent work by Lee et. al. [11], the secret key is 
constructed by a P K G  together with several key 
privacy authorities (KPAs). In practice, this ap­
proach is not very practical.
The second problem in ID-based cryptography is 
still related to the key extraction protocol, namely 
the requirement to have a secure channel between 
the P K G  and the user during the protocol. We 
note that the resulting key extracted from this pro­
tocol is the secret key that is only known by the 
user. If this key is somehow leaked, then anyone 
can either sign on behalf of the user or read the 
message intended to the user. Therefore, the ex­
istence of a secure channel between the P K G  and 
the user is essential. In practice, a secure channel 
needs to be established by using a public key in­
frastructure, and hence, it returns to the problem 
of having a traditional cryptosystem (by requiring 
each party to provide certificate, etc.). This prob­
lem has recently been addressed Sui et. al. [6], and 
their proposed solution is by adding randomness to 
the identity that is sent by the user during the key 
extraction algorithm. However, we note that this 
approach is not practical and somehow it violates 
the idea of the key extraction algorithm itself. As 
noted earlier, in the key extraction algorithm, the 
P K G  needs to identify the correctness of the ID, 
and in the approach that was taken in [6], the P K G  
cannot verify the authenticity of the ID since the in­
formation that is sent by the user is randomized.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we revisit the notion of key extraction 
algorithm and solve the two existing problems in 
ID-based cryptography mentioned in the previous 
section. In particular, our key extraction algorithm 
will not require the user to place his/her trust to a 
single P K G  and more importantly, our key extrac­
tion algorithm does not require the existence of a 
secure channel. Moreover, our key extraction algo­
rithm will work with any previously known schemes, 
such as Boneh-Franklin’s IBE scheme [2]. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that 
solves the two problems in ID-based cryptography 
at the same time.
Organization of The Paper
In the next section, we provide some required back­
ground concepts and some related works in this 
area. Then, we describe our key extraction algo­
rithm in stages. In section 3, we describe our first 
key extraction protocol. In this protocol, we have 
successfully removed the need of a secure channel. 
However, the P K G ’s key escrow problem still ex­
ists. In section 4, we improve our first scheme by 
removing escrowing problem. The only assumption 
that we make is the PKG s  will not collude against 
the user. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Prelim inaries
In this section, we briefly review the basic concepts 
on bilinear pairing together with some complexity 
assumptions, while introducing the notations used 
throughout this paper.
2.1 B asic C oncepts on B ilinear Pair­
ings
Let G i,G 2 be cyclic additive groups generated by 
P i , P 2 , respectively, whose order are a prime q. Let 
Gm be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same 
order q. We assume there is an isomorphism tjj : 
G2 —> Gi such that i/j(P2 ) =  Pi- Let e : Gi x 
G2 —> Gm be a bilinear mapping with the following 
properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP,bQ) =  e (P ,Q )ab for all P  € 
Gi, Q G G2, a, b, G TLq.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P  G Gi, Q G G2 
such that e(P, Q) ^  1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algo­
rithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P  G Gi, Q G 
G2.
For simplicity, hereafter, we set Gi =  G2 and Pi =  
P2. We note that our scheme can be easily modified 
for a general case, when Gi A G2.
A  Bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as 
a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm IQ  that 
takes as input a security parameter £ and returns a 
uniformly random tuple par am =  (p , Gi, Cm, e, P ) 
of bilinear parameters, including a prime number 
p of size I, a cyclic additive group Gi of order q, 
a multiplicative group Gm  of order q, a bilinear 
map e : Gi x Gi —> and a generator P  of Gi. 
For a group G of prime order, we denote the set 
G* =  G \ {O }  where O is the identity element of 
the group.
2.2 C om plexity  A ssum ptions
D efin itio n  1 B ilin ea r  D iffle -H eilm an  (B D H )  
P ro b lem .
Given a randomly chosen P g  Gi, as well as aP, bP
and cP (for unknown randomly chosen o, b, c G 7Z-q), 
compute e(P, P )abc.
D efin itio n  2 D ec is io n a l D iffle-H ellm an
(D D H ) P rob lem .
Given a randomly chosen P  G Gi, as well as 
aP,bP,cP, for some a,b,c G 2*, decide whether
7
e =  ab holds with equality.
It is well-known that DDH problem in Gi is easy, by 
performing MOV reduction, that states the discrete 
logarithm problem (DLP) in Gi is no harder than 
the DLP in G2.
D efin itio n  3 D ec is io n a l B ilin ea r  D iffle- 
H ellm a n  (D B D H ) P ro b lem .
Given a randomly chosen P  G Gi, as well as 
aP, bP, cP  and r, for some a, b, c, G 2* and
r G Gm, decide whether r  =  e {P ,P )abc holds with 
equality.
D efin itio n  4 D ec is io n a l H ash  B ilin ea r  D iffle- 
H ellm a n  (D H B D H ) P ro b lem .
Given a randomly chosen P  G Gi, as well as 
aP,bP,cP and r, for some a,b,c,r € 2*, decide
whether r  =  h(e(P, P )abc), where h : Gm  —> 2*, 
holds with equality.
D efin itio n  5 D ec is io n a l H a sh  B ilin ea r  D iffle- 
H ellm a n  A ssu m p tio n .
I f  IQ  is a DHBDH parameter generator, the 
advantage Advip(A) that an algorithm A  has 
in solving the DHBDH problem is defined to 
be the probability that the algorithm A  outputs 
“yes” when r =  h (e (P ,P )abc) holds on inputs 
Gi, Gjif, e, P, aP, bP, cP, where (G i,G jf,e ) is the 
output of IQ  for sufficiently large security parame­
ter I, P  is a random generator of Gi and a, b, c are 
random elements of ~2Lq and h : Gm  —■' 2*. The 
DHBDH assumption is that kd.VjgBDH (A ) is neg­
ligible for all efficient algorithms A.
2.3 B oneh-Franklin’s ID -based  En­
cryption  Schem e
Using the bilinear pairing, an ID-based encryption 
(IBE) scheme can be designed. For completeness, 
we review the construction of an IBE scheme due 
to Boneh-Franklin [2] as follows.
In general, there are four algorithms in ID-based 
cryptosystem as follows.
• Setup. A deterministic algorithm that is run 
by a trusted authority to generate global sys­
tem parameters and master key.
• Extract. A  deterministic algorithm that is 
run by a trusted authority on inputting the
master key together with an arbitrary bit string 
ID g {0,1}*, to generate the user’s private key 
<Sid- That is, <Sid <— Extract(ID).
• Encrypt. A probabilistic algorithm that en­
crypts a message under the public identity ID. 
That is, C  <— IDEncrypt(m, ID).
• Decrypt. A deterministic algorithm that re­
ceives a ciphertext and a private key <S|d, to 
generate the corresponding plaintext. That is,
m <— IDDecrypt(C, <Sid).
The ID-based cryptosystem proposed by Boneh 
and Franklin is as follows.
• Setup. P K G  generates two groups (O i,+ ) 
and (Gm ,-) ° f  prime order q and a mapping 
pair e : (G i,+ )2 —> (Gm,-)- He also selects 
an arbitrary generator P  € Gi. Then, he 
picks s € Z 9 and set Ppub =  sP, where s 
denotes the master key. Finally, two crypto- 
graphically strong hash functions are selected: 
F  : {0,1}* —> Gi, H  : Gm —* {0 ,1 }", where n 
denote the size of the plaintext message space. 
The system parameters and their descriptions 
are (G i , GM , e, q, P, Ppub, F, H ).
• Extract. After performing physical identifica­
tion of Bob and making sure the uniqueness of 
ID, P K G  generates Bob’s secret key as follows. 
P K G  computes Q =  P(ID) and <S|d =  sQ. <S|d 
is Bob’s secret key.
• Encrypt. To send an encrypted message to 
Bob, Alice first obtains the system parame­
ter and Bob’s identity to compute Q =  P(ID). 
Then, to encrypt a message m 6 {0 ,1 }", Alice 
picks r  e Z q and computes g\Q =  e(Q, rPpub) 
and C =  (rP ,m  ®  H(g\o))- The ciphertext is 
C =  (rP, m  ©  H (pid))-
• Decrypt. Let C =  (U, V ) be a ciphertext re­
ceived by Bob. To decrypt C using his private 
key <S|d, Bob computes V  © H(e(S\o, U )).
The security of this scheme relies on BDH assump­
tion in the random oracle model [2].
In this paper, we are concentrating on the key 
extraction algorithm Extract. We aim to demon­
strate a key extraction algorithm that does not suf­
fer from the problems mentioned above. To the best 
of our knowledge, our scheme is the first scheme 
that offers a key extraction algorithm without hav­
ing the two problems mentioned earlier.
3 T he B asic Schem e
In this section, we present our basic key extraction 
algorithm that preserves the advantages of ID-based 
cryptography. Intuitively, our scheme works as fol­
lows. There are two PK G s  in the system. It is 
assumed that the PKG s  will not collude against 
the user. Each user needs to visit both PKGs to 
obtain his/her secret key (via the key extraction al­
gorithm). The secret key is delivered by the P K G  
to the user via a public channel (and hence, no se­
cure channel required). We employ the technique 
from Joux’s tripartite Diffle-Hellman key agreement 
[8, 9] and a blind signature scheme [4, 12] to con­
struct our proposed scheme. The aim of this basic 
scheme is to eliminate the need of any secure chan­
nel.
3.1 M odel
As mentioned in [2], to avoid a complete trust to 
a single PK G , multiple PKG s  can be employed. 
In our model, we strictly use two PKGs, namely 
P K G q and PKG\. We assume that both PKGs 
do not collude against the user.
In the key extraction algorithm, each user vis­
its each P K G  to obtain his/her partial secret keys. 
The secret keys are delivered via a public channel 
(and hence, no secret channel is required). Only the 
user, who can retrieve the secret key, can use the 
secret key in any ID-based cryptosystem.
Remarks: Though our scheme does not need se­
cret channel, in practice we may still want to employ 
such a channel for simplicity.
3.2 T he Schem e
The system parameter for the scheme is identi­
cal to Boneh-Franklin’s scheme, namely (G i,G 2,e, 
q,P ,Ppub,F ,H ), which is publicly available. Each 
P K G  selects a secret key Si 6 Z* and computes
Ppub, =  &iP
for i =  0,1. Hence, the tuple (P, Ppubo, Ppu^) is 
part of the system parameter to replace (P, Ppub) 
in a single P K G  setting. Define an additional hash 
function h : G2 —> Z*. Hence, the complete system 
parameter is (G 1,G 2,e ,q ,P ,P pubo,P publ,F ,H ,h ).
Key Extraction A lgorithm
There are three steps in this algorithm.
Step 1.
Let ID denote a user’s uniquely identifiable identity. 
The user performs the following.
1. Select a random r G Z*.
2. Compute R  =  rP .
3. Send ID and R  to the P K G i.
Step 2.
Upon each user’s visit, the P K G i, i =  0,1, will 
perform the following.
1. Compute Q =  -F(ID), where Q £ Gi, and Q is 
the user’s unique ID-based public key.
2. Compute the user’s secret key as
<S|D =  h(e(PPubie i,R )Si) ■ SiQ
3. Send iS|*D to the user via a public channel (note 
that this value can be just broadcasted).
Step 3.
After visiting both PKGs, the user obtains two se­
cret keys namely S(q and iS/p, where
<S|°D =  h(e(Ppubl, R )So) ■ s0Q
and
S|D =  h(e{Ppubo, R ) Sl) ■ siQ
The authenticity of the partial secret key <S(D can 
be verified by testing whether
e(StD,P )  =  e(Q,Ppubi)h^ p^ p^ V )
holds with equality. I f both partial signatures are 
authenticated, then the user will compute
S i n  =  ^ I D  +  5  D
h(e(Ppubo,P publ) r )
to obtain his secret key. The user’s secret key is of 
the form
<Sid =  s0Q +  sxQ
Correctness.
The correctness of the secret key extraction is jus­
tified as follows.
£ _  ^ ID  +  5 b
10 h(e(Ppubo,P publ) r )
h(e(P, P ) s°sir) • s0Q +  h(e(P, P ) SoSir)siQ  
~  h (e (P ,P )s°s i r )
h {e (P ,P y °s' r )(soQ +  SlQ) 
h(e{P, P ) s°si r )
=  s0Q +  «iQ  
=  (so +  «i)Q
I
Remarks:
• We note that the secret key obtained from our 
extraction algorithm can be used in any other 
ID-based system that has similar structure, 
such as Boneh-Franklin’s IBE system, with re­
spect to the public key Ppuba and Ppubl.
• To illustrate the encryption algorithm in 
Boneh-Franklin’s IBE, the encryption and de­
cryption algorithms are defined as follows.
— Encrypt. To send an encrypted message 
to Bob, Alice first obtains the system pa­
rameter and Alice’s identity to compute 
Q =  E(ID). Then, to encrypt a mes­
sage m £ {0, l } n, Bob picks s £ Zq and 
computes gtD =  e(Q, sPpubo +  sPpubl) and 
C =  (sP,m  © H(g\o)). The ciphertext is 
C  =  (sP ,m ®  H{g\o)).
— Decrypt. Let C  =  (U, V ) be a cipher­
text received by Bob. To decrypt C  us­
ing his private key <S|d, Bob computes 
V (B H (e (S lD,U )).
The correctness of the decryption algorithm is ob­
vious and hence, it is omitted.
3.3 Security A nalysis
Theorem 1 Our proposed key extraction algorithm 
does not require the existence of any secure channel.
Proof. The partial secret key provided by each 
P K G i is in the form of
<5|b =  h(e(PPubim ,R )Si) ■ SiQ
The only participant who can derive the partial se­
cret key SiQ from <S|*D is only the user who knows 
r, where R =  rP . This is due to Joux’s tripartite 
Diffle-Hellman key agreement [8], Hence, no secure 
channel is required. I
Lemma 1 In our first scheme, each P K G  can per­
form key escrow to the user’s secret key.
Proof. The partial secret key is derived from a tri­
partite key agreement among PKGo, P K G i and 
the user. Hence, when PKG o  sends the user’s par­
tial secret key <S|°D, P K G i can always obtain this 
partial secret key as well. We will show how to 
eliminate this problem in our second scheme. I
Theorem 2 Our key extraction algorithm is un- 
forgeahle if DHBDH problem is hard.
Proof. To show the unforgability of our scheme, let 
us assume there is an attacker A  who obtains the 
partial key extraction from the P K G  and success­
fully retrieves the partial secret key without know­
ing either the PK G s’ secret keys nor the user’s se­
cret key. We will show how to construct an algo­
rithm B that will invoke the attacker A  in the sim­
ulation. The purpose of B is to solve an instance of 
DHBDH problem.
For clarity of the presentation, let us recall the 
ability of the attacker A  together with the goal of
the algorithm B. Having received a partial secret 
key <S|*D, where
^id =  h(e{Ppubimi,R )St) • SiQ
A  can derive ŝ Q without knowing any of the secret 
key involved. The purpose of the algorithm B is to 
decide whether r  =  h(e(P, P )abc) holds for the tuple 
(aP, bP, cP, r), where a, b,c,r € Z*. The simulation 
is as follows.
Preparation.
B prepares the public keys of the PKGs  as Ppub0 =  
aP  and Pvub1 =  bP. Then, the public parameter 
(Gi, G2, e, q, P, Ppubo, Ppubi, F, H ) is provided to A. 
Key Extraction.
To simulate the key extraction, B computes 
S =  r  • R
where R  G is chosen randomly. Then, B sends 
S together with cP  to A. Receiving S, cP  from B, 
A  can output 5, where
s *
h(e(P, P )abc) '
Then, B will perform the following.
?
• If 5 =  R  holds, then output “yes” , to indicate 
that r  =  h(e(P, P )abc) holds with equality.
• Otherwise, output “no” .
The success probability of B is the same as A. 
Hence, we obtain the contradiction and complete 
the proof. I
4 T he Second Schem e: R e­
m oving th e  K ey Escrow
In this section, we extend our basic scheme to re­
move the ability of each P K G  to derive the user’s 
partial secret key during the partial key extrac­
tion, and hence, the key escrowing problem can be 
eliminated. The scheme is very similar to our first 
scheme mentioned in the previous section, with sev­
eral modifications as follows.
K ey  Extraction Algorithm
There are three steps in this algorithm.
Step 1. The same as our first scheme.
Step 2.
Upon each user’s visit, the P K G i, i =  0,1, will 
perform the following.
1. Compute Q =  E(ID), where Q G Gi, and Q is 
the user’s unique ID-based public key.
2. Select a random point T) G Gi.
3. Compute the user’s secret key as
=  h(e(Ti, R )s' )  ■ SiQ
4. Send iS|lD and T) to the user via a public channel 
(these values can be just broadcasted).
Step 3.
After visiting both PKGs, the user obtains two se­
cret keys namely S°D and <S|q, where
<Sl0D =  h(e(T0,R )so)-soQ and 
5l1D = ft(e(Ti,J2)ai) -a1Q
together with To and T\. The authenticity of the 
partial secret key <S|*D can be verified by testing 
whether
e(Sjb,P) =  e(Q ,PPubi)h{i(Ti'P̂ )r)
holds with equality. If both partial signatures are 
valid, then the user will compute
o   £lb | § d______
10 h(e(To, PpuboY) h(e(T1,PpublY )
to obtain his complete secret key. The user’s secret 
key is of the form
*5id =  soQ +  siQ
4.1 Security A nalysis
Theorem 3 Our second scheme does not permit 
each P K G  to reveal the partial secret key sent by 
the other PK G .
Proof. Unlike our first scheme, our second scheme 
removes the ability of the other P K G  to read the 
partial secret key sent over the public channel. This 
is due to the use of two randomly chosen points by 
each PK G . I
Theorem 4 Our second scheme is unforgeable iff 
DBDH problem is hard.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of 
Theorem 2 and therefore it is omitted. I
Remarks:
• In our second scheme, each P K G  cannot re­
trieve the user’s partial secret key (and hence, 
the complete secret key). However, it was 
noted in [13] that key escrow is sometimes 
needed, for instance under a court order. In 
our scheme, we assume that the PKG s  will not 
collude against the user. Nevertheless, under 
a court order, both PKG s  can be called upon 
and hence, they can cooperatively decrypt a ci­
phertext to recover the required plaintext that 
is encrypted using the private key (in the IBE 
scheme).
4.2 E xtension  to  M ultip le PK G s
It is easy to see that our second scheme can be eas­
ily extended to support more than two PKGs. The 
idea is illustrated as follows. During the key extrac­
tion algorithm, each P K G i will compute the user’s 
secret key as
SiD = h(e(Ti,R y ' ) -8 iQ
for a random T; e Gi, and finally send 5d and Ti 
to the user via a public channel. After collecting 
the partial secret keys from n PKGs, the user can 
retrieve his/her public key by computing
S'D = % H e (T u P PubiY Y
The computed secret key can be verified as follows
n
e(S|D,-P) =  E [e(Q ,Ppu6i)
where Ppub, denotes the PKGi s public key.
5 C onclusion
In an ID-based cryptography, key extraction algo­
rithm assumes that the P K G  is trusted and can 
always perform key-escrow. Additionally, a secure 
channel between the P K G  and the user is required 
during the key extraction algorithm. In this paper, 
we firstly proposed a key extraction algorithm that 
overcomes these two limitations. We provide our 
security proof under a standard assumption.
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